Who Benefits from Public Housing? by Eerola, Essi & Saarimaa, Tuukka
Essi Eerola
Tuukka Saarimaa
Who Benefi ts from 
Public Housing?
VATT INSTITUTE FOR ECONOMIC RESEARCH
VATT Working Papers 68
VATT WORKING PAPERS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
68 
Who Benefits from Public Housing? 
 
Essi Eerola 
Tuukka Saarimaa 
 
  
Valtion taloudellinen tutkimuskeskus 
VATT Institute for Economic Research 
Helsinki 2015 
  
 
Essi Eerola, Bank of Finland and CESifo, essi.eerola@bof.fi 
Tuukka Saarimaa, VATT Institute for Economic Research, 
tuukka.saarimaa@vatt.fi 
 
 
We thank Heikki A. Loikkanen, Teemu Lyytikäinen, Niku Määttänen, Mattias 
Nordin, Marko Terviö, Otto Toivanen and the seminar participants in the 
FEAAM, IIPF, UEA and OFS for useful comments. Jaakko Meriläinen and Ville 
Mäkinen provided excellent research assistance. We also wish to thank the city 
of Helsinki for providing the data and the Academy of Finland for funding 
(Project “Modeling Housing Market Frictions – Tools for Policy Analysis”, grant 
number 255445). The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and 
do not necessarily represent the views of the Bank of Finland. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ISBN 978-952-274-164-6 (PDF) 
 
ISSN 1798-0291 (PDF) 
 
 
Valtion taloudellinen tutkimuskeskus 
VATT Institute for Economic Research 
Arkadiankatu 7, 00100 Helsinki, Finland 
 
Helsinki, December 2015 
Who Benefits from Public Housing?  
 
VATT Institute for Economic Research 
VATT Working Papers 68/2015  
 
Essi Eerola – Tuukka Saarimaa 
 
Abstract  
This paper studies how much public housing generates rent savings for the 
tenants, how these savings are distributed among the tenants, and whether the 
tenants reside in better quality neighborhoods than similar low-income private 
rental tenants. Our rent savings estimates are based on a hedonic regression and 
detailed data on the private and public rental housing units from the city of 
Helsinki. We estimate that the total subsidy to public housing tenants is 
considerable and comparable in size to the housing allowance, the main tenant-
based housing program. We also find that the subsidy is less targeted towards 
low-income households than the housing allowance. Regarding neighborhood 
quality, we find that public housing tenants live in lower quality neighborhoods 
than similar households living in private rental housing. This result suggests that 
public housing is not better than the housing allowance in delivering better 
neighborhood quality to low-income households.  
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1.	Introduction	
Housing programs that are directed towards reducing low-income households’ housing 
costs can be divided into two broad categories: (1) project- or place-based programs, 
such as public rental housing or privately-owned subsidized rental housing; and (2) 
tenant-based programs, such as housing vouchers and allowances. Both types of 
programs are designed to generate rent savings for low-income households and thereby 
influence housing and non-housing consumption.  
Place-based programs are often seen as problematic because the subsidy in the 
form of rent savings is by design targeted to specific geographic locations, i.e. a 
household benefits from the program only by residing in a specific building and 
neighborhood. This feature may result, for example, in high concentration of poor 
households in particular neighborhoods and buildings. On the other hand, the same 
feature also implies that the location of public housing and tenant selection can be used 
to promote desirable neighborhood social mix or to prevent harmful segregation.1  
However, existing evidence on the degree to which different housing programs 
improve households’ access to better neighborhoods is mixed.2 In this paper, we 
analyze a large public housing program and contribute to the discussion on the relative 
merits of the different types of programs. We use detailed data on the private and public 
rental housing units and their tenants in the city of Helsinki. Our rental market data 
contain information about the attributes of the housing units including their exact 
location. We can merge the rental market data to household register data containing 
information on the tenants’ socio-economic background and incomes. 
Our analysis consists of two parts. In the first part, we study how much the public 
housing tenants benefit in terms of rent savings. We estimate this benefit by employing 
hedonic regression methods to recover implicit prices for different housing attributes 
within the private rental market where there are no restrictions on rent setting. We then 
                                                 
1 Segregation is a natural phenomenon in an urban area with heterogeneous land quality and local 
amenities. Given that these amenities are normal goods, high-income households tend to outbid low-
income households for better quality neighborhoods and households will sort into neighborhoods 
according to income (e.g. Bayer et al., 2007 and Bayer and McMillan, 2012). While natural, this tendency 
may also have harmful effects. Although the mechanisms creating neighborhood disadvantage are not 
well understood, there exists some evidence on the causal effects of neighborhoods on especially 
children’s long-term outcomes. For more on this discussion, see e.g. Galster et al. (2008), Cheshire et al. 
(2008), Chetty et al. (2015) and Chetty and Hendren (2015). 
2 See e.g. Olsen (2009), Olsen and Zabel (2015) and Collinson et al. (2015) for further discussion.  
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use these implicit prices to predict market rents for the public housing units. This 
prediction reveals the rent that a particular public housing unit would command in the 
private market. The difference between the prediction and the actual rent allows us to 
determine the unit specific subsidy (or rent saving) and to analyze whether and how the 
subsidy depends on the physical attributes or the location of the unit. Finally, we 
combine the subsidy estimates with register data on households and compare the 
distributional effects of the program to those of a large tenant-based program (means-
tested housing allowance).3 
In addition to generating rent savings for low-income households, the public 
housing program explicitly aims at creating mixed-income neighborhoods and 
buildings. Thus, in the second part of the paper, we compare the neighborhood quality 
of low-income public housing tenants and similar households living in private rental 
housing. This comparison allows us to assess the ability of the public housing program 
to create mixed-income neighborhoods and to affect the exposure of low-income 
households to different neighborhood quality measures. 
Our findings can be summarized as follows. We estimate that the total subsidy to 
households living in public housing units in Helsinki is considerable and amounts to 
151 million Euros per year. The average annual subsidy to a public housing household 
is 4450 Euros. The total amount paid in housing allowances is somewhat larger, roughly 
at 166 million Euros, while the mean annual housing allowance to a recipient was 3840 
Euros. The size of the public housing subsidy depends on the physical attributes of the 
unit and especially its location. The subsidy decreases substantially as the distance to 
the central business district (CBD) increases and is highest in expensive areas.4  
                                                 
3 If the supply subsidies for social housing increase the overall stock of housing, an increase in social 
housing may lower the overall rental rate. Existing empirical evidence suggests that supply subsidies lead 
to substantial crowding out, especially in locations with inelastic supply, and therefore benefit little in 
terms of increased overall housing stock (e.g. Malpezzi and Vandell, 2002, Sinai and Waldfogel, 2005, 
Baum-Snow and Marion, 2009 and Eriksen and Rosenthal, 2010). However, it should be kept in mind 
that our rent saving estimates do not take into account any general equilibrium effects that would occur if 
the whole public housing program would be abolished.  
4 Burge (2011) studies the low-income housing tax credit (LIHTC) program in the U.S. and finds that the 
LIHTC is unlikely to lead to meaningful rent savings for the tenants. On the other hand, Le Blanc and 
Laferrère (2001) show that in France the rent savings for the tenants are non-negligible and tend to 
increase with city size and decrease with flat size. They also show that some 35% of the benefits go the 
richest half of the population, while only some 5% of housing allowances go to households in the richest 
half of the population. Both studies focus on privately-owned subsidized rental housing. 
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We also find that the distributional effects of the public housing subsidy and the 
housing allowance are quite different. The housing allowance is much more 
concentrated to low-income households than the public housing subsidy. The 
households in the lowest two income deciles receive 66% of the total amount of the 
housing allowance, but only 34% of the rent savings created by public housing. 
Moreover, 22% of the public housing subsidy goes to the top half of the income 
distribution.  
When assessing the differences in neighborhood quality, we find that households 
with higher income levels tend to live in higher quality neighborhoods. This is true for 
both private rental housing and public housing. More importantly, however, we find that 
low-income households living in public housing are exposed to lower quality 
neighborhoods (measured either at the zip code or at the building level) than similar 
low-income households living in private rental units. All in all, our findings suggest that 
public housing is not better than the housing allowance in delivering better 
neighborhood quality to low-income households.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In the next section, we discuss the 
institutional details of the Finnish housing policy programs with special focus on the 
Helsinki housing market. We then present and discuss the data and describe our 
empirical strategy in determining the rent savings of public housing tenants. In section 
4, we present our results on the distributional effects together with the effects on 
neighborhood quality. Section 5 concludes.  
2.	Institutional	setting	
In Finland, a large social housing sector co-exists with private rental market. 
Roughly 40% of all rental housing can be characterized as social housing owned either 
by municipalities (public housing) or non-profit organizations (privately-owned 
subsidized housing). In Helsinki, the share of social housing is slightly higher than the 
national average and roughly 70% of all the social housing units are public housing 
owned by the city of Helsinki.5 
                                                 
5 These figures suggest that the social housing sector in Helsinki is quite large in European comparison 
(see, e.g. Scanlon, 2015). 
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The social housing program is managed by the Housing Finance and 
Development Centre of Finland (ARA), an off-budget government agency operating 
under the supervision of Ministry of Environment. The program covers both public 
housing and privately-owned subsidized housing. It dates from the mid 1940’s and 
consists of different subsidy schemes for construction and renovation of rental housing. 
The details as well as the stated objectives have changed over time. Currently, the main 
objective is to provide affordable housing for low-income households.6 In addition, the 
program aims at creating socially balanced neighborhoods and diversified buildings in 
terms of household composition.  
The owners of social housing units receive subsidies from the municipalities (e.g. 
low lot rents) and the central government (e.g. interest-subsidy loans and state 
guarantees) and are subject different types of regulation. Most importantly, the rents are 
regulated for a certain period of time after construction (in most cases 40 years). During 
this time, the rent has to be based on capital and maintenance costs of the building.7 As 
a result, there is no direct link between the private rental rate and rents in social housing. 
Instead, the rent difference between the two sectors depends on the local housing market 
conditions. 
Tenant selection is based on legislation. The selection criteria include applicant’s 
need for housing, financial situation and income.8 However, in order to achieve the 
objective of socially balanced neighborhoods, a vacant public housing unit may also be 
allocated to a middle-income household. Once a household has obtained a social 
housing unit, it has the right to occupy the unit indefinitely, even if its income increases.  
The other major housing program is the housing allowance program financed by 
the government through the Social Insurance Institution of Finland (KELA). The 
program consists of a general housing allowance and separate schemes for pensioners 
and students. In total, the housing allowance expenditures amounted to some 1.5 mrd 
Euros (or 0.75% of GDP) in 2014.  
                                                 
6 However, part of the stock is explicitly directed towards special groups (the disabled, students and the 
elderly).   
7 The cost items that can be included in the rent are set by ARA. 
8 Each owner has its own application procedure. In the case of the city of Helsinki, the applicants do not 
apply for a specific flat, instead they specify in the application one or several neighborhoods from which 
they search for a flat. There is no explicit ranking of the applicants or a formal queuing system.  
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The housing allowance is means-tested and depends on the characteristics of the 
households (income and household size in particular) as well as on the rent (or housing 
costs) and characteristics of the dwelling (most importantly size). Eligibility does not 
depend on whether the household lives in private rental housing, social housing or 
owner-occupied housing, but 95% of the housing allowance recipients live in rental 
housing.  
There is considerable overlap between the social housing program and the 
housing allowance program. For instance, roughly 10% of all households in Helsinki 
received general housing allowance in 2014 and half of the recipient households lived in 
public housing or privately-owned subsidized housing.  
3.	Predicting	market	rents	and	subsidy	
3.1	Data	sources	
We use data from a number of sources. First, we use register data on households and 
their dwellings consisting of a 15% random sample of all households living in Helsinki 
from 2011. These data come from Statistics Finland. For each household, the data 
contain information about the physical attributes of the housing unit and location of the 
building. All the units can be classified as owner-occupied, public housing, privately-
owned subsidized rental housing, or private rental housing. In addition, we have 
collected information on the rents of the public housing units from the city of Helsinki.9 
These rent data are not available for privately-owned subsidized rental housing. This 
means that we will not be able to estimate the rent savings for these tenants. Therefore, 
all the results on rent savings apply to public housing tenants only.  
In order to predict the market rent of the public housing units in our data, we use 
data on private rental units collected from a commercial website (Vuokraovi.com), 
where landlords publish information about the units available for rent. All major 
institutional landlords use it as an advertising channel. The website covers the whole of 
Finland, but we only use information on units in Helsinki. We accessed the website on a 
                                                 
9 Our data contain the average monthly rent per square meter in each public housing building (roughly 
700 buildings in Helsinki). In some buildings, the rent per square meter is the same in all units. In others, 
it varies somewhat according to the size and the story of the unit.  
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weekly basis starting in May 2012 until the end of December 2013. Each observation 
contains detailed information about the unit including the address.  
3.2	Hedonic	regression	
The first step in our analysis is to estimate the market rent of the public housing units. 
Because housing is a differentiated product, we need to have information on how 
different attributes of the units are priced in the private market. Table 1 reports 
descriptive statistics for the units in our private rental market sample and in our public 
housing data. The table shows that the average monthly rent per square meter in public 
housing is roughly half of the average rent in the private rental market. 
However, the difference in the average rents would not be a good measure of the 
rent savings in public housing, because private rental units and public housing units 
differ also in other respects. Public housing units (in our sample) are on average larger, 
newer and situated farther away from the central business district (CBD) than private 
market units. These observations motivate the use of hedonic regression techniques in 
recovering reliable estimates of the rent savings of the public housing tenants.  
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics: housing units. 
  Private rental market Public housing 
  Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Observations 4,737 5,064 
Rent per m2 19.3 4.27 9.81 0.77 
Floor area (m2) 55.5 20.6 59.7 17.5 
Number of rooms 2.15 0.87 2.39 0.86 
Age (years) 29.0 27.2 32.0 15.8 
Balcony (0/1) 0.70 0.46 0.64 0.48 
Sauna (0/1) 0.33 0.47 0.04 0.19 
Distance to CBD (km) 6.89 3.40 8.36 2.75 
Notes: The data on private rental units are from Vuokraovi.com. The public housing rent data are from 
the city of Helsinki and the public housing unit characteristics data are from Statistics Finland. 
 
The map in Figure 1 further illustrates the spatial distribution of the public housing units 
in our data. The data on public housing are shown only for those zip code areas for 
which we also have rental data on private market units. The CBD is situated in the 
south-west peninsula.  
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where ijp  is the monthly rent of a private market unit i in zip code j, x are the unit’s 
physical attributes including distance to CBD, μj represent zip code area11 fixed effects 
that capture unobservable location specific attributes, and u is the error term.  
In the estimation, we need to worry about two distinct set of attributes, the 
physical attributes of the housing unit and the characteristics of the neighborhood. In 
principle, we could add variables describing the neighborhood characteristics in the 
regression equation in the same manner as the physical characteristics of the unit and 
hope that the remaining unobserved neighborhood characteristics are a minor problem. 
However, a more reliable approach is to use spatial fixed effects (μj), which enable 
modelling the effect of different location attributes without having to include them 
separately into the model. This is useful in our setting, because we are not interested in 
estimating the effect of various neighborhood characteristics on rents.  
In addition to unobservable neighborhood attributes, we need to worry about 
unobservable unit attributes, most importantly the condition of the unit. There may exist 
differences in the condition of the units in the two sectors as landlords in the private 
rental market are likely to have stronger incentives to maintain and improve the 
condition of their units than public housing landlords. This is a potential problem 
because the difference in the predicted market rent and the actual rent for the public 
housing units can arise from this omitted variable. 
With these caveats in mind, we define the unit specific rent saving or the public 
housing subsidy for public housing unit k as 
 
(2) ˆ ,subk k ksubsidy p p   
 
where ˆkp  is the out-of-sample prediction from Eq. (1) for unit k and 
sub
kp  is the unit’s 
actual rent. Of course, the accuracy of our subsidy estimate relies on the reliability of 
our market rent prediction. In order to be able to assess our prediction, we draw from 
the private rental market data a 10% random sample which we do not use in the 
estimation. We then predict the market rent and calculate a prediction error for each 
                                                 
11 Helsinki is divided into some 80 zip codes with an average size of roughly 7,000 inhabitants. In our 
data, there are public housing units in 45 zip code areas. In the estimation, we use private market data 
only from these areas. 
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significant at 5% level. This means that there is no systematic bias in our prediction. As 
a result, although there is a lot of measurement error in our rent prediction, we are not 
systematically overestimating the rent savings for, say, large units or units in certain 
locations.  
Finally, we analyze more closely the determinants of the subsidy. Because 
dwellings are differentiated products, the price differences between private and public 
rental units can arise from the way physical attributes or location are priced. In columns 
(2) and (3) of Table 2 we present the results from two hedonic regressions. Column (2) 
presents the results from the regression that we used to predict market rents. Column (3) 
presents the results for the same model specification, but using the public housing units.  
As can be seen from columns (2) and (3), the differences in the implicit prices of 
physical attributes partly explain the size of the subsidy of a given public housing unit. 
The price differences are mostly related to the floor plan (number of rooms conditional 
of floor area) and age of the units. Furthermore, unit attributes and zip code fixed effects 
explain a larger share of the total variation in rents in the public housing sample 
compared to the private market sample. Of course the coefficients reported in column 
(3) do not contain information about households’ marginal willingness to pay for unit 
attributes, but instead they simply reflect the pricing schedule of the city. 
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Table 2. Hedonic regression results. 
  
Prediction error 
for private units Private units Public units 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Constant 55.10 739.9*** 208.5*** 
  (74.67) (60.67) (29.51) 
Floor area 4.807 8.987*** 9.109*** 
  (3.723) (1.601) (0.646) 
(Floor area)2 -0.041 0.011 0.007 
  (0.031) (0.011) (0.006) 
Age 0.603 -4.666*** -5.456*** 
  (2.282) (1.075) (0.906) 
Age2 -0.025 0.044 0.086*** 
  (0.057) (0.028) (0.024) 
Age3 0.00006 -0.00003 -0.0004*** 
  (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
  2 rooms (ref. 1 room) -42.95* 23.95** -0.908 
  (24.99) (11.67) (3.611) 
  3 rooms -8.699 60.99*** -4.494 
  (31.48) (13.49) (5.115) 
  4 rooms or more -37.83 89.41*** -12.17 
  (58.32) (24.17) (9.217) 
Sauna (0/1) -1.115 57.72*** 1.251 
  (20.37) (12.49) (6.734) 
Balcony (0/1) -13.22 -10.08 -3.266 
  (26.11) (10.64) (2.634) 
Distance to CBD -25.16 -9.650 -2.891 
  (24.05) (8.321) (7.243) 
N 473 4,264 5,064 
R2 0.17 0.87 0.98 
Notes: The table reports results from OLS regressions using housing unit level data. All the models 
include zip code level fixed effects.  
 
In addition to the implicit prices of physical attributes of the unit, the subsidy can 
arise from differences in the price of location. In Figure 3, we plot the subsidy as a 
function of distance to the CBD (or the Helsinki central railway station). As the figure 
shows, the monthly subsidy to a given housing unit decreases as the distance to the 
CBD increases. The same pattern arises if we measure the monthly subsidy per square 
meter. 12  
                                                 
12 This relationship does not show up in Table 2 because of the zip code fixed effects. 
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4.	Household	analysis	
4.1	Distribution	of	public	housing	subsidy	
In this section, we link our estimates of the unit specific subsidies to the characteristics 
of the tenants. Table 3 shows descriptive statistics of owner-occupiers, private rental 
housing tenants and public housing tenants in our data.  
The public housing tenants have on average lower incomes than those in private 
rental housing. The renters in the two segments are also different in other respects: 
Households in public housing tend to be less educated, larger and have more often small 
children. Out of all public housing tenants, some 23% also receive housing allowances, 
while the share of housing allowance recipients is 13% among the private rental housing 
tenants and only 2% among the owner-occupiers. The average allowance is higher in 
public housing than in private rental housing. This difference can be explained by 
public housing tenants having more often small children and living in larger units.13   
 
Table 3. Descriptive statistics: households.  
  Homeowners Private rental Public housing 
  Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Observations 21,934 10,915 5,354 
Age of household head 54.1 17.0 40.1 16.4 48.5 16.6 
Disposable income (€/year) 34,659 47,877 22,953 19,685 18,519 8,206 
Master's degree 0.27 0.45 0.16 0.36 0.04 0.19 
Household size 1.93 1.10 1.49 0.85 1.94 1.26 
Household with children 0.10 0.30 0.07 0.25 0.13 0.34 
Housing allowance recipient 0.02 0.13 0.13 0.33 0.23 0.42 
Housing allowance (€/year) 2,775 2,307 3,521 2,601 4,321 2,567 
Public housing subsidy (€/year)         4,449 1,033 
Notes: The mean housing allowance is calculated over households that received housing allowance. 
Disposable income includes the housing allowance, but does not include the public housing subsidy 
 
                                                 
13 Differences in rents per square meter are unlikely to account for the differences in the average housing 
allowance in the two sectors because of a ceiling in the rent per square meter. Market rents per square 
meter in Helsinki tend to be well above the ceiling. When the rent per square meter is higher than the 
ceiling, the part exceeding the ceiling is ignored when calculating the housing allowance. This ceiling was 
abolished in 2015 when the housing allowance was reformed. 
16 
 
In order to study the distributional effects of the public housing subsidy, we divide 
households into income deciles based on their disposable income.14 Panel A of Figure 5 
presents the shares of different tenure status (owner-occupied, private rental housing, 
public housing and privately-owned subsidized housing) in the different income deciles. 
Two interesting observations stand out. First, in the lowest deciles, private rental 
housing is more common than social housing (public housing and privately-owned 
subsidized housing combined). For example, in the lowest decile, more than 40% of the 
households live in private rental housing while only roughly 20% lives in public 
housing or privately-owned subsidized housing. Second, both public housing and 
privately-owned subsidized housing extend well beyond the lowest deciles.  
Panel B of Figure 5 shows the distribution of the public housing subsidy in each 
income decile. For comparison, the figure also reports the housing allowance in each 
decile.15 For each decile, the figure shows the share of total public housing subsidy and 
total housing allowance. Recall that eligibility for housing allowance depends on 
household income and composition, but not on tenure. That is, renters in different 
sectors (public housing, privately-owned subsidized housing and private rental housing) 
as well as owner-occupiers can all be housing allowance recipients. 
The distributions of these two benefits are quite different. The households in the 
lowest two deciles receive some 66% of the total amount of the housing allowance, but 
only 34% of the rent savings created by public housing. Therefore, the public housing 
subsidy is clearly less targeted towards the low-income households than the housing 
allowance. Moreover, 22% of the public housing subsidy goes to the top half of the 
income distribution.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
14 We scale the household income using the OECD equivalence scale which assigns value 1 to the first 
adult household member, 0.7 to each additional adult and 0.5 to each child.  
15 The housing allowance includes both the general housing allowance and the pensioners’ housing 
allowance. We exclude all students that receive the students’ housing allowance and also students who 
live in public housing. These public housing units are typically shared apartments.  
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Table 4. Household characteristics by income quintile.  
  I II III IV V 
Panel A: All households       
Number of households 8,341 8,340 8,341 8,340 8,340 
Disposable income (€/year) 10,782 17,635 23,603 30,785 58,652 
Household size 1.54 1.66 1.80 1.96 2.07 
Mean floor area (m2) 48.5 55.8 59.9 66.9 86.1 
Housing allowance (€/year) 2,581 2,115 1,661 1,271 1,088 
Panel B: Public housing tenants           
Number of households 1,861 1,775 1,079 610 111 
Disposable income (€/year) 11,719 17,371 23,383 30,163 43,468 
Household size 2.01 1.88 1.94 1.96 1.96 
Mean floor area (m2) 57.2 60.4 61.1 62.4 66.1 
Housing allowance (€/year) 2,764 2,112 1,934 1,321  - 
Public housing subsidy (€/year) 3,471 3,497 3,448 3,374 3,296 
Public housing subsidy (€/m2/month) 7.06 6.49 6.57 6.52 6.27 
Panel C: Private rental tenants           
Number of households 3,156 2,325 2,296 1,895 1,243 
Disposable income (€/year) 10,085 17,621 23,550 30,525 52,948 
Household size 1.34 1.45 1.48 1.63 1.79 
Mean floor area (m2) 38.9 43.1 44.9 50.9 66.4 
Housing allowance (€/year) 2,562 2,123 1,615 1,238 -  
Notes: The income quintiles are based on disposable income scaled by the OECD equivalence scale. All 
the numbers represent quantile means in the household groups. The annual means of disposable 
household income, the housing allowance and the public housing subsidy are scaled by the OECD 
equivalence scale. The mean housing allowance is calculated over households that received housing 
allowance. Disposable income includes the housing allowance, but does not include the public housing 
subsidy. 
 
4.2	Public	housing	subsidy	and	neighborhood	quality	
By reducing the price of housing relative to other consumption, both tenant-based and 
project-based policies can affect the location choices of low-income households. Due to 
the lower price of housing, households can either increase other consumption or 
increase housing consumption by moving to a larger unit or to a better quality 
neighborhood. Therefore, both tenant-based and project-based programs may influence 
the neighborhood quality of low-income households.17  
However, project-based programs can also be used to influence who lives next to 
a low-income household. Targeting a fraction of the public housing subsidy towards 
                                                 
17 Carlson et al. (2012) review the evidence on the effects of tenant-based programs on households’ 
relocation decisions. 
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middle-income and high-income households can, therefore, be motivated by the aim of 
creating mixed-income neighborhoods and buildings.18  
Within the Finnish program, the creation of mixed-income neighborhoods and 
buildings can happen through building location, tenant selection or through the 
unlimited right to occupy the public housing unit once obtained. In this section, we 
evaluate whether the program is successful in achieving this aim.19 More specifically, 
we will ask whether low-income public housing tenants are exposed to better quality 
neighborhoods than similar low-income households living in private rental units.   
We use zip code areas and buildings to define a neighborhood and consider four 
neighborhood quality measures: the median disposable income, the share of households 
under the local poverty line (defined as having less than 60% of the median income in 
Helsinki), the share of households with a master’s degree and the rental rate in private 
rental housing. The first three measures are directly related to the characteristics of the 
neighbors that the low-income households are exposed to. The last measure aims at 
capturing neighborhood amenities that capitalize into rental rates.  
Our strategy is to compare the exposure of public housing tenants and private 
rental tenants to different neighborhood characteristics by income quintile using the 
following regression model: 
 
(3)  5 5, ,
2 1
,i j j i j i j i i i
j j
Y I P I   
 
       z β  
 
where Y is a measure of neighborhood (or building) quality, P is a dummy variable 
indicating public housing tenancy, I is an indicator function taking value one if 
household i belongs to income quintile j and zero otherwise, z is a vector of household 
characteristics and ε is the error term. It is important to control for household 
characteristics as the private rental and public housing tenants differ in a number of 
respects (see Table 4). 
                                                 
18 For example, Leung at al. (2012) argue using a general equilibrium sorting model that the location of 
public housing units is a fundamental policy variable when it comes to influencing low-income 
households’ access to local public goods.  
19 For a discussion on similar policies, see Collinson et al. (2015). 
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Table 5 reports the estimation results for the zip code area level using a sample of 
only private rental tenants and public housing tenants.20 As expected, private rental 
housing tenants in higher income quantiles tend to live in neighborhoods with higher 
median income, less poverty, higher education level and higher market rents. All in all, 
the results indicate residential sorting according to income. 
Two results stand out from Table 5 concerning public housing tenants. First, the 
public housing tenants in the lowest income quintile live in lower quality neighborhoods 
than similar private rental tenants in the same quintile. They live in neighborhoods with 
some 2,400 Euros or 10% lower median income than similar low-income households in 
private rental housing. In other words, low-income public housing tenants live in less 
diversified neighborhoods than private rental tenants. They also live in neighborhoods 
with a lower share of households with a master’s degree (roughly 8 percentage points) 
and a lower rental level in the private rental housing (roughly 2.4 Euros per square 
meter) indicating lower levels of neighborhood amenities.21  
Second, the pattern across income quintiles in the public housing sector is quite 
similar to that in the private market. Public housing tenants higher up in the income 
distribution live in better quality neighborhoods than the ones in the lowest income 
quintile. In fact, the public housing tenants in the second and third income quintile live 
in similar zip codes as the private rental tenants in the same income quintile. However, 
the comparison between the public housing tenants and private rental housing tenants in 
the fourth and fifth income quintile indicates that the public housing tenants live in zip 
codes with lower median income (by 1,451 Euros) and lower share of households with a 
master’s degree (by 3.6 percentage points).  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
20 We include only those zip codes that have at least 20 households in our data. The number of 
households in our sample in these zip codes ranges from 29 to 1736. 
21 It is possible that private rental market tenants and public housing tenants in the first income quintile 
are different even if we control for household characteristics. An alternative way to control for underlying 
differences is to focus on those low-income households that are housing allowance recipients each month 
of the year. When doing so, we obtain the same results: housing allowance recipients in public housing 
live in neighborhoods with lower median income, lower share of people with a master’s degree and lower 
market rents than similar housing allowance recipients in private rental market.   
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Table 5. Neighborhood exposure at zip code level.  
  
Median 
income 
Poverty 
rate 
Share with 
a master's 
degree 
Mean rent 
(€/m2) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Constant 23397*** 0.199*** 0.206*** 20.90*** 
  (613.0) (0.011) (0.015) (0.606) 
2. quantile 54.18 -0.004** 0.002 0.051 
  (122.7) (0.002) (0.004) (0.142) 
3. quantile 683.9*** -0.011*** 0.016*** 0.326* 
  (171.8) (0.002) (0.004) (0.170) 
4. quantile 1315*** -0.016*** 0.034*** 0.761*** 
  (263.0) (0.004) (0.006) (0.249) 
5. quantile 2622*** -0.029*** 0.066*** 1.370*** 
  (400.6) (0.005) (0.010) (0.342) 
1. quantile * public tenant -2392*** 0.014* -0.076*** -2.407*** 
  (476.6) (0.008) (0.013) (0.509) 
2. quantile * public tenant 94.71 -0.000 0.003 0.029 
  (145.0) (0.003) (0.004) (0.168) 
3. quantile * public tenant -253.6 0.002 -0.004 -0.259 
  (212.7) (0.003) (0.006) (0.199) 
4. quantile * public tenant -742.81* 0.007 -0.019** -0.456 
  (319.5) (0.005) (0.008) (0.306) 
5. quantile * public tenant -1451** 0.011 -0.036** -0.764* 
  (565.5) (0.008) (0.014) (0.412) 
N 14,534 14,534 14,534 14,412 
R2 0.20 0.08 0.24 0.24 
Household controls yes yes yes yes 
Notes: The table reports results from OLS regressions using household level data where the outcome 
variables are measured at the zip code level. The sample includes only renter households and those zip 
codes that have at least 20 households in our data. The household level control variables include the age 
of household head, an indicator whether the household has small children, an indicator whether the 
household is single and the number of persons in the household. Standard errors are clustered at the zip 
code level and are reported in the parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10 
percent level, respectively. 
 
There are at least three potential explanations for this sorting by income pattern in 
the public housing segment. First, the rental rate in public housing units tends to be 
higher close to the CBD, although the rent differences between neighborhoods are much 
less pronounced than in the private rental market. Second, since the rent savings tend to 
be larger in attractive neighborhoods, the lock-in effects should be larger in these 
neighborhoods. This means that public housing tenants in attractive neighborhoods may 
be less likely to move when their income increases. Finally, the public housing units in 
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attractive neighborhoods may become vacant less frequently than other units. If so, low-
income households may not be able to afford to wait for such a unit and are therefore 
not selected into attractive locations.22 However, because the number of public housing 
tenants especially in the fifth quintile is quite small (see Panel B of Fig. 5), the figures 
should be interpreted with some caution. 
The neighborhood characteristics to which low-income public housing tenants are 
exposed to are naturally at least partly driven by the location of the public housing 
buildings and hence composition of private rental tenants and owner-occupiers in the 
neighborhoods. It is therefore possible that the pattern we observe at the zip code level 
is due to the location of buildings. The same is not true at the building level. In 
principle, at least, the characteristics of the residents in a given public housing building 
can be directly influenced by tenant selection. In order to see whether this happens, we 
report in Table 6 the results of the neighborhood exposure estimation at the building 
level.23  
The results are quite similar to those in Table 5. Low-income public housing 
tenants (the first income quintile) live in buildings with a lower median income, a 
higher share of households below the city level poverty threshold, and a lower 
education level than similar low-income households in private rental housing. In fact, 
the differences to exposure between these two household groups are larger at the 
building level than at the zip code level.24 This suggests again that allocating some of 
the public housing units to middle-income and high-income households does not 
guarantee that the low-income public housing tenants live in buildings with a more 
diverse residential structure than similar low-income households. 
There are various potential explanations for why the low-income private rental 
tenants live in buildings with more diverse residential structure. The results may be 
related to tenant selection and differences in the strength of the lock-in effects in the 
same manner as at the zip code level. In addition, one potentially important issue is that 
                                                 
22 We do not observe the length of stay in current house in the data. We also do not have information 
about the tenant selection. Therefore, we cannot assess the importance of these different explanations. 
23 We do not consider the average rental rate because it does not have the similar interpretation at the 
building level as at the zip code level.  
24 We estimated these models using only those households who received the housing allowance in each 
month of the year. The results are similar. 
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private rental housing tenants often live in the same buildings with owner-occupiers. 
Because owner-occupied households have on average higher income levels these 
mixed-tenure buildings tend to be more mixed-income than those that are reserved for 
rental use only. Although we are not able to assess the relative importance of these 
explanations in driving the results of Table 6, it seems nevertheless far from obvious 
that public housing works better in delivering mixed-income buildings than tenant-
based alternatives. 
 
Table 6. Neighborhood exposure at building level.  
  
Median 
income 
Poverty 
rate 
Share with a 
master's 
degree 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Constant 20320*** 0.319*** 0.191*** 
  (687.5) (0.027) (0.017) 
2. quantile 799.1*** -0.078*** 0.001 
  (263.5) (0.011) (0.008) 
3. quantile 2434*** -0.109*** 0.006 
  (305.1) (0.011) (0.009) 
4. quantile 4899*** -0.136*** 0.059*** 
  (599.4) (0.018) (0.011) 
5. quantile 5913*** -0.149*** 0.093*** 
  (747.6) (0.020) (0.014) 
1. quantile * public tenant -4139*** 0.083*** -0.122*** 
  (482.0) (0.022) (0.010) 
2. quantile * public tenant 515.5 -0.027 0.004 
  (390.4) (0.020) (0.009) 
3. quantile * public tenant -514.2 -0.005 -0.001 
  (512.1) (0.024) (0.010) 
4. quantile * public tenant -2863*** 0.033 -0.060*** 
  (853.4) (0.034) (0.013) 
5. quantile * public tenant -2896** 0.044 -0.087*** 
  (1198) (0.045) (0.020) 
N 3,343 3,343 3,343 
R2 0.35 0.20 0.34 
Household controls yes yes yes 
Notes: The table reports results from OLS regressions using household level data where the outcome 
variables are measured at the building level. The sample includes only those buildings that have at least 
10 households in our data. The household level control variables include the age of household head, an 
indicator whether the household has children, an indicator whether the household is single and the 
number of persons in the household. Standard errors are clustered at the zip code level and are reported in 
the parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. 
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The results reported in Tables 5 and 6 are qualitatively similar to the results found 
in the U.S. For example, Horn et al. (2014) find that in the U.S. housing voucher 
holders live near better schools than public housing tenants, whereas Lens et al. (2011) 
find that voucher holders live in safer neighborhoods (in terms of crime) than public 
housing tenants.25 These similarities suggest that it is difficult to design place-based 
housing subsidy programs so that poor tenants would not end up in poorer quality 
neighborhoods than households that receive tenant-based subsidies. This is true even in 
Helsinki where the social mixing has been a stated goal of the program throughout its 
history. Nonetheless, the details of the program design are important when assessing 
and comparing the effects of public housing programs. These details include the 
location of the public housing units, tenant selection rules and the rent level compared 
to private rental housing.  
5	Conclusions	
In this paper, we analyzed the effects of a large public housing program in Finland. In 
the first part of this paper, we used hedonic regression to analyze whether public 
housing units have lower rents than comparable private rental units. We estimate that 
the total rent savings or subsidy to households living in public housing units in Helsinki 
is considerable and comparable in size to the housing allowance, which is the main 
tenant-based housing subsidy program. At the housing unit level, the size of the public 
housing subsidy depends on the physical attributes of the unit and especially its 
location. The subsidy decreases substantially as the distance to the CBD increases. In 
addition, when comparing the distribution of the public housing subsidy to that of the 
housing allowance, we find that the public housing subsidy is clearly less targeted 
towards low-income households.  
In the second part of the paper, we studied whether the public housing program is 
able to create socio-economically mixed neighborhoods and buildings. Our results 
indicate that the low-income public housing tenants live in lower quality neighborhoods 
and buildings than similar private rental housing tenants in the same income quintile. 
                                                 
25 These studies also report racial differences with respect to these results.  
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This result holds both at a neighborhood level (zip code areas) and at the building level 
and is consistent across different measures of neighborhood quality. These results 
suggest that public housing is not better than the housing allowance in delivering better 
quality and more diversified neighborhoods to low-income households.  
Several important questions remain unanswered. Perhaps the most important 
questions are related to the effects of a major reform or elimination of the program. Our 
estimates of the public housing subsidy are not directly useful when evaluating such 
reforms. Because the public housing sector constitutes a large share of all rental housing 
in Helsinki, a large reform would result in a new sorting equilibrium with new 
equilibrium housing prices (see e.g. Bayer and McMillan, 2012). Therefore, such policy 
changes cannot be evaluated without taking into account general equilibrium effects. 
In order to have a more complete picture of the welfare effects of the program, it 
would also be useful to know more about who is selected into the public housing units 
and who moves out. The first question is related to the degree of potential misallocation 
of units when allocation involves rationing (see e.g. Early, 2000 and Glaeser and 
Luttmer, 2003). The second is related to the lock-in effects caused by public housing 
following from the fact that the subsidy received is tied to specific housing units (see 
e.g. Lui and Suen, 2011). These issues are left for future work.  
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